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ABSTRACT 
 
Technical analysis has been used in stock market forecasts for more than a century and 
it is one of the basic applications of the modern day finance. However these methods 
have for decades raised conflicting opinions in the science community, leaving the field 
a subject of disdain by academics. The purpose of this thesis is to test whether a hybrid 
of money flow index (MFI) and relative strength index (RSI) yields abnormal returns on 
Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges. The hybrid of MFI and RSI is a volume 
weighted RSI, which‟ predictive power is solely based on utilization of historical stock 
prices and trading volumes. MFI-RSI hybrid measures market momentum and indicates 
„oversold‟ and „overbought‟ levels on the market oscillating between 0 and 100.  
 
The predictability of the market will be studied by applying the MFI-RSI vehicle on 
equally weighted country indices and a combined portfolio of the 450 stocks. The re-
sults indicate that MFI-RSI hybrid has trend predicting abilities at 5 % significance lev-
el on a bear market, but the transaction costs erode the profits on a bull market. The 
results suggest market efficiency in Finland, Norway and Sweden, yet the predictive 
power under distress market condition signals of a change in the investor sentiment dur-
ing financial crisis. In addition to the excess returns, an insight is taken on the strategy‟s 
risk reducing properties. 
____________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Technical analysis, relative strength index, money flow index, predic-
tive ability 
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1. INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The purpose of technical analysis is to extract recurring and predictable price patterns 
from the historical data with the help of price and volume information. The history of 
this type of analysis dates back to commodity markets of 1600
th
 century, as the Japanese 
rice traders traded on the Dojima Rice Exchange in Osaka (Wong, Manzur & Chew, 
2003). Technical analysis has been one of the basic financial practices for decades, but 
the applications based on the historical price and volume data has never enjoyed similar 
trust and acceptance as fundamental analysis. One of the most important reasons for 
questioning the technical methods as a true science is that it has been difficult to show 
undisputed evidence on the efficiency of technical analysis.  
 
As several technical methods are also based on visual identification of patterns, tech-
nical analysis is also known as “charting” and is often considered by academics to be 
highly subjective. Visual pattern identification is however likely to be a common prac-
tice due it‟s conductivity for human cognition (Lo, Mamaysky & Wang, 2000), and ma-
jority of the technical tools are based on purely quantitative methods aiming to extract 
predictable price components. Wong et al. (2003) suggest that recent applications on 
computational science could mean that upcoming concepts in technical analysis would 
include chaos theory, fuzzy logic and genetic algorithms.  
 
Majority of the studies discussing the information content of stock price and volume 
data, including Fama‟s and Blume‟s (1966), support the market efficiency hypothesis, 
claiming that past prices and volume can‟t contain information, giving that weak form 
efficiency is fulfilled. However a substantial amount of literature has collected evidence 
(e.g. Brock, Lakonishok and LeBaron, 1992; Sullivan, Timmerman and White, 1999) 
suggesting that technical analysis in fact captures predictable components in stock pric-
es. Moreover, Menkhoff (2010) explains how a vast majority of fund managers apply 
technical analysis in their investment decisions and that in case of short horizon invest-
ments the technical aspects are even greater than those of fundamental analysis. The 
science community has also gone some length in order to find evidence from technical 
analysis profitability in markets other than US and UK stock exchanges. These markets 
include emerging stock exchanges such as Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan (Bessembinder 
& Chan, 1995), India (Sehgal & Garhyan, 2002) and Mexico (Garza-Gomez, Metghal-
chi & Chen, 2010). The amount of academic literature about technical analysis has risen 
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in the recent years, and it is noteworthy that approximately half of the empirical studies 
performed after 1960 date between 1995 and 2004 (Park & Irwin, 2007).  
 
Among the mentioned studies there have been conclusions for and against the predictive 
power of technical analysis, and the results will be reviewed in the third section of the 
thesis. The theoretical basis of technical methods has in a way been strengthened due to 
discoveries of stock returns such as market anomaly returns that can not be explained by 
common risk (e.g. Bernard & Thomas, 1990). An explanation for the results in contrast 
with random walk hypothesis can be market inefficiency, as the prices shift from the 
fundamental values. Brock et al. (1992) note that according to another theory the mar-
kets are efficient and the predictability is a result of time-varying equilibrium returns. 
The authors mention that short horizon returns have been also tried to explain by market 
microstructure, that is, price reversals stemming from bid-ask movements. Brock et al. 
suggest the latter explanation to be implausible. 
 
The strategy used in the thesis employs past price and volume data, using the 14-day 
data to extract „oversold‟ and „overbought‟ market levels on short time horizon. For the 
tests in this study only one parameter set for one technical indicator is used in order to 
avoid data snooping, a very common phenomena attributed to technical analysis. A sin-
gle technical method can be altered with statistical methods enough to find a fitting pat-
tern for a historical time series and to invalidate the results. For instance Jensen and 
Benington (1970) note that if they are given enough computer time, they are able to 
create trading rules on any table of random numbers, given that they are allowed to use 
the same table of numbers. The rules used in other tables would turn out to be useless. 
 
1.1  Purpose of the study 
 
The purpose of this study is to test a combination of money flow index (MFI) and rela-
tive strength index (RSI) on stocks of Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges 
and to seek evidence on whether the possibilities of earning abnormal returns exist. 
Thus, the contribution for technical analysis research is to answer the main research 
question of the thesis; does MFI-RSI yield statistically significant abnormal returns dur-
ing the observation period? The combination of MFI and RSI oscillators (hereafter re-
ferred as MFI-RSI) is a form of hybrid, also called a volume-weighted RSI (Yen & Hsu, 
2010). In order to avoid data snooping bias, a single oscillator parameter length and 
strategy is under investigation. The observation period will be divided into three sub-
periods in order to extract the predictive abilities under different market conditions. In 
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terms of market efficiency, it is sensible to examine market phases separately in order to 
determine what effects the market sentiment has on the predictability. 
 
MFI-RSI is a measure of momentum, thus it assumes values between 0 and 100. The 
aim of this thesis is not to identify the optimal parameter set for the strategy by data 
mining, but a brief insight is taken on the risk ratio sensitivity for the parameter adjust-
ment.  
 
1.2  Structure of the study 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the market efficiency 
and the basic assumptions related to the information content of stock prices. Section 3 
explains background, basic assumptions and theoretical foundations of technical analy-
sis. Section 4 will present an overview of the technical indicators studied in academic 
literature and applied by practitioners. Section 5 introduces the data set, methods and 
the hypothesis and in section 6 the results are examined. Finally, section 7 provides my 
conclusions and suggestions for further research. 
 
1.3  Limitations of the study 
 
There are three important limitations in this study, the most considerable one being the 
relatively short observation period. The theoretical foundations of technical analysis are 
disputed, as serial correlations can even be extracted as a cause of a subtle data-
snooping bias. Thus, it is highly probable that a reoccurring price patterns can be found 
for any length of period and the findings can be supported by models that are in fact 
capturing an arbitrary chance. Brock et al. (1992) use 60 years of data in their study in 
order to reduce the effects of data-snooping. However, the settings of the testing vehicle 
in this study are simplified and only one investment strategy is utilized, which is to 
avoid mining for self-fulfilling selection of parameter sets.  
 
Another limitation is the construction of the tested indices. The stocks are weighted 
equally, which generally is far less common approach on empirical testing of invest-
ment strategies. Also, equal weighting as such allows a fluctuation of a single stock to 
have an unnaturally powerful effect on the market index. This must be acknowledged, 
as it has been shown by for instance Fama and French (2008) that anomalies are empha-
sized when observing equal weight indices. 
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The third limitation to be considered is the sample-selection bias, as in order to be in-
cluded in the final sample a time series of a stock has to contain a sufficient amount of 
data. This eliminates the firms that have been listed during the observation period as 
well as the bankrupted firms or the firms that for other reasons are no longer listed in 
the observed stock exchanges. The high number of eliminated firms combined with pre-
viously mentioned artificial construction of indices might have a negative effect on the 
significance of the results, as these weaken the test reproducibility. However, as the 
indices are weighted equally, removing the above named firms as possible outliers can 
be expected to have a stabilizing effect on the daily returns.  
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2. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND RANDOM WALK 
 
The very essence of questioning the profitability of technical trading rules lies within 
the fact that a said efficient market has at any given moment discounted the information 
at hand in the prices. Having been unable to identify predictable patterns in stock prices, 
Kendall (1953) shook the grounds of financial analysis at his time by concluding that 
the data was behaving like “wandering series”. These results then were paving the way 
for modern day random walk theory. Unpredictability of future stock prices can be de-
rived from the fact that if positive future performance is to be expected, it will cause a 
favorable current performance as the market participants will be exploiting the expected 
price increase. Hence, the stock price indicates market expectations as random steps 
around the trend (Bodie, Kane & Marcus, 2005).  
 
2.1 Behavioral finance 
 
According to Fama (1970), the optimal market prices reflect the information about 
firms‟ activities fully. This is based on Fama‟s suggestion that “the primary role of the 
capital fact is allocation of ownership of the economy’s capital stock”. Fama‟s paper 
has been cited by academics countless times and it‟s undeniably an elementary study in 
today‟s finance, however the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is challenged by the 
competing explanation based on investor psychology, where quite comprehensive over-
view of the studies is offered by Shefrin (2002). Behavioral finance is supported by 
commonly known discoveries of several persistent market anomalies, such as post-
earnings announcement drift (e.g. Ball & Brown, 1968; Bernard & Thomas, 1990), cal-
endar anomalies (e.g. Gibbons & Hess, 1981) and even sport result anomalies (Edmans, 
Garcia & Øyvind, 2007).  
 
Volatility has been attributed to market inefficiency. Shiller‟s (1981) model inquires 
whether the price movements are disproportionately large in terms of information about 
future, dividends and real stock prices. According to Shiller the excessive variance 
could be explained with either very large movements on real interest rates or market 
irrationality. The author suggests that it‟s not implied that rational, optimizing investors 
could at all times profit from these “fads”, meaning that mispricing is not necessarily 
corrected. Behavioral finance explains irrational market phenomena by investor senti-
ment, which is a combination of beliefs about asset returns and risk levels not based on 
facts (Baker & Wurgler, 2007). This leads to a situation where rational investors are not 
able to utilize all arbitrage possibilities and thus don‟t attempt to force prices to their 
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fundamental, correct levels at all times. The authors suggest the same factors to cause 
mispricing from the fundamental values as did for instance Bernard and Thomas (1990); 
sentiment change on behalf of irrational investors and arbitrage limit on the part of ra-
tional investors. Arbitrage limits commonly refer to short sale constraints or to a situa-
tion, where utilizing the small mispricing is not profitable due to costly trading envi-
ronment (e.g. transaction costs). 
 
According to the underlying assumption of EMH an investor can‟t predict stock prices 
as the information is already discounted in the price. A mispriced asset would offer an 
arbitrage opportunity, but by EMH the abnormal profit opportunities will immediately 
be exploited by market participants. These would be ordinary returns (Bodie et al., 
2005) and merely compensation for the risk. The explanation of reward for holding an 
asset has faced opposition; many of the earlier named anomalies have existed for dec-
ades and therefore weakened the risk-based explanation. Today‟s literature also 
acknowledges that market anomalies are caused by market participants, who, being hu-
man beings after all, naturally have their biases (e.g. Abarbanell & Bernard, 1992; She-
frin, 2002). Baker and Wurgler (2007) also note that the recent stock market history, 
Internet bubble and Nasdaq crashes further validate theories of investor psychology. 
Despite the sentimental fluctuation on broad market indices, Baker and Wurgler (2007) 
remind that aggregate risk aversion affects all stocks on some degree, but some individ-
ual stocks are more affected than others. The suggestion referring to sentiment beta 
seems justified, as investors valuations of firms differ. For instance, expectations of 
future cash flows of a growth company can be highly subjective in case of dispersed 
forecasts by analysts. 
 
2.2 Three forms of market efficiency 
 
The dialogue between the views of market efficiency hasn‟t ceased, and evidence has 
been uncovered both against and for market efficiency theory. Fama (1970) suggests 
three forms of efficiency, differed by weak form tests, semi-strong form tests and strong 
form tests. 
 
2.2.1 Weak form tests 
 
According to the weak form hypothesis the stock prices reflect all information that‟s 
possible to derive from past prices or volumes. Trading data is publicly available for all 
market participants, thus making technical analysis worthless. The hypothesis states that 
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if historical data contained information that could be used to predict performance in the 
future, investors would utilize this immediately.  
 
The informational inefficiency is also associated with emerging markets which for in-
stance Bessembinder and Chan (1995) have found to be consistent with their results on 
testing technical analysis on the Asian stock market. From the six countries observed, 
technical rules indeed had the predictive power especially in Malaysia, Thailand and 
Taiwan, indicating inefficiency on these markets during the sample period. Hudson, 
Dempsey and Keasey (1995) however noted that even if their own findings on predic-
tive ability of technical methods on UK market were positive, investors could not earn 
excess returns in a costly trading environment. Hence the conclusions of the latter sup-
ported the weak form hypothesis.  
 
2.2.2 Semi-strong form tests 
 
On a semi-strong market all publicly available information is at all market participants‟ 
hand at the same time. In addition to the historical data dictated by weak form hypothe-
sis, the semi-strong form contains the firm‟s fundamentals, including but not limited to 
balance sheet, earnings and performance forecasts. Small but economically significant 
predictability has been found for instance by Ferson, Heuson and Su (2005) on US mar-
kets. 
 
2.2.3 Strong form tests 
 
The strong form is fulfilled if no market participants have monopolistic, insider infor-
mation relevant for price formation. The statement is drastic, as examination of corpo-
rate insider information is difficult as such. Insider information is highly regulated in 
the market, but defining insider trading is far more difficult. Strong form hypothesis has 
been rejected for instance by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and Kara and Denning 
(1998). 
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3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND UTILIZATIONS OF 
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS 
 
 
As fundamental analysis recognizes the prospects and future performance forecasts of 
the firm, technical analysis recognizes the same information in stock price assessment. 
The principal difference between the disciplines is the price formation view, as techni-
cians‟ pursue the supply and demand on the stock in addition to the expectations on the 
firm (Bodie et al, 2005). The theoretical foundation as a whole is thus based on changes 
in investor sentiment. The market participants‟ reaction to the information at hand is a 
gradual, trend developing process, which is believed to be captured from historical trad-
ing data, such as stock prices and volumes (Marshall, Young & Rose 2005). This state-
ment is in an apparent contradiction with EMH, thus creating conflict among scholars. 
Both Alexander (1964) and Fama and Blume (1966) have concluded that the returns 
earned by technical filter rules are diminished by transaction costs. Consistent with 
EMH, the findings implicate that no abnormal returns can be achieved as the costs in-
crease.  
 
Many years of controversy surrounding EMH and the scholars‟ determination in ex-
plaining modern economy with a more dynamic model have led to introduction of adap-
tive market theory, AMH (Lo, 2004). Accounting for principles of supply and demand, 
Lo (1999) had suggested a framework of the three Ps of total investment management; 
prices, probabilities and preferences. According to the author this framework and the 
interactions between the three Ps would determine the equilibrium in which demand 
would equal supply across all markets. One of the key terms presented in AMH is sur-
vival, time-varying dynamics exist on the market, meaning that different methods of 
analytics perform in different markets in in different points of time. Support for the evo-
lutionary nature of AMH has been found for instance by Neely, Weller and Ulrich 
(2009), who discovered that technical trading rules on foreign exchange markets were 
able to extract profit opportunities in the 1970s and 1980s but the opportunities disap-
peared by the early 1990s. 
 
In their study on theories of financial anomalies, Brav and Heaton (2002) state: “At  a 
minimum,  future  work  must  focus  on  the  interaction  of  rational  and irrational 
investors.  That work must start with the expectations formation of rational arbitrageurs 
(and their investors) in environments where irrationality might also exist.” The authors 
note that market irrationality might also stem from external events, such as stock market 
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crashes. This would suggest different levels of predictability under different market 
conditions. 
 
In addition to applications on stock markets, technical methods are often employed as 
decision tools on commodity markets (e.g. Yen & Hsu, 2010) foreign exchange markets 
(e.g. Allen & Taylor, 1990; Gehrig & Menkhoff, 2006; Menkhoff & Taylor, 2007). 
Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) in fact conclude that in various surveys presented in eight 
academic studies, 90 % of the responded exchange professionals used technical analysis 
in some horizon and the weight given to technical analysis relative to fundamental anal-
ysis at various horizons varied between 30 % to a little over 50 %, which might partly 
explain the academic interest towards technical analysis on currency markets. Further-
more, the authors cast light on the reasons why technical analysis is continuously used 
on foreign exchange markets by presenting four explanations. First, if following the 
principles of EMH and considering foreign exchange markets at least weakly efficient, 
the use of technical analysis would be considered as evidence of irrational behavior 
(admitting that consistently irrational behavior by market professionals doesn‟t follow 
EMH either). Another explanation would be that the existence that market participants 
with significant influence on the market but no direct interest in generating profits could 
generate profit opportunities for technical analysts. Major central banks have been pro-
posed to be such group. Thirdly, if it takes time for exchange rates to reflect economic 
fundamentals, technical analysis may detect the influences earlier. Finally, in addition to 
the fundamentals, financial prices may also reflect components influenced by other 
sources, such as noise traders (Trueman, 1988) and even self-fulfilling influences of 
technical method trading. An overview of some empirical studied on technical analysis 
is seen on table 1. 
 
3.1  Momentum 
 
The evidence of stock prices displaying short-term momentum over periods between six 
months exists (De Bondt & Thaler, 1985) and economically significant price reversals 
have been disclosed over short horizons between one week and one month (Jegadeesh, 
1990). Significant results on momentum-based strategies have been recently disclosed 
by for instance Leivo and Pätäri (2011).  
 
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) have suggested that investors underreact to firm-specific 
information release. A similar psychological explanation was already established by 
Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) who attributed the effect to psychological forces causing  
18 
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Table 2. Explanations for the abbreviation used on table 1. 
 
Indicator 
abbreviation 
  Indicator name   
Indicator 
abbreviation 
  Indicator name 
CA 
 
Candlestick 
 
MSV 
 
Momentum Strategy in 
Volume 
CC 
 
Commodity Channel  
 
OBV 
 
On-balance volume 
DI 
 
Direction Indicator 
 
PO 
 
Price Oscillator 
FI 
 
Force Index 
 
PSAR 
 
Parabolic Stop and 
Reversal 
FR 
 
Filter rules 
 
QS 
 
Q-sticks 
LR 
 
Linear Regression 
 
ROC 
 
Rate of Change 
MA 
 
Moving Average 
 
RSI 
 
Relative Strength Index 
MACD 
 
Moving Average 
Convergence/Divergence  
STO 
 
Stochastic oscillator 
MFI 
 
Money Flow Index 
 
TRB 
 
Trading range breakout 
(support and resistance) 
MOM   Momentum indicator 
 
WR   Williams % R 
 
humans placing too little weight on a change in a series. The phenomenon is known as 
the cognitive bias (Andreassen & Kraus, 1990).   
 
Evidence of stronger momentum gains after bear markets has been discovered by 
Siganos and Steeley (2006) who attribute this to the bias of investors to underreact 
(overreact) to information following bear (bull) markets. Similar evidence had earlier 
been found by Griffin and Martin (2003), who reported on higher momentum profits 
during bear markets. Siganos et al conclude that this supports the theory according to 
which the momentum effect stems from underreaction to information (e.g. Hong & 
Stein, 1999). 
 
Friesen, Weller and Dunham (2009) aim to provide an explanation for momentum by 
presenting a theoretical model for these autocorrelation patterns in asset returns by in-
troducing confirmation bias (e.g. Hirshleifer, 2001) into the model. The approach is 
designed to identify investors‟ interpretation of information and relies on this infor-
mation creating price patterns. The authors recognize return autocorrelations of different 
time horizons and suggest that the psychological bias based model evidently captures 
these fluctuations through technical analysis. 
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3.2 Trading volume 
 
There are numerous studies documenting patterns and price-related correlations on trad-
ing volume. Volume translates to investor information, and is thus assumed to precede 
price. In academic literature it is also common to assume that volume is a result of in-
vestors taking long positions, since short selling costs often are high.  
 
According to Karpoff‟s (1987) review of previous research, price data could be generat-
ed by conditional stochastic process, where a changing variable parameter could be ex-
plained by volume. Karpoff concludes that large volumes and large price changes are 
tied to information flows.  
 
Models based on volume aim to extract information that‟s not possible to gather from 
price data only. In their study on the role of volume on commodity markets, Blume, 
Easley and O‟Hara (1994) concluded volume to contain explanatory power on the quali-
ty of traders‟ information signals. The authors model volume as a factor affecting the 
behavior of the market and not only describing it. While the authors indeed find evi-
dence of predictive power of technical analysis, it is important to note that the study 
discusses applications for thinly followed stocks, thus leaving more active and effective 
markets untouched. 
 
According to Garfinkel and Sokobin (2005) in event studies it‟s possible to extract a 
component of volume that can‟t be explained by prior trading activities. The authors 
study post-earnings announcement drift (see e.g. Bernard & Thomas, 1990), interpreting 
volume as an indicator of opinion divergence among investors. When the opinions are 
more dispersed, post-event returns increase, suggesting that opinion divergence is an 
additional risk factor. Another explanation for high market-wide trading volume and 
high individual security turnover is offered by Statman, Thorley and Vorkin (2006), 
who propose investors to be overconfident about their own valuation and trading skills.  
 
In their paper studying cross-autocorrelations in stock returns, Chordia and Swamina-
than (2000) found trading volume to be a significant determinant. Exploring CRSP 
NYSE/AMEX stocks under 33 years, the authors said the results to suggest some level 
of market inefficiency. Consistent with Fama and Blume (1966), the reason for the prof-
it opportunities not being arbitraged away could lie in transaction costs. 
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3.3 Volatility 
 
Technical trading rule profits have been partly attributed for volatility and time-varying 
risk premia by for instance Kho (1996), who found time-varying conditional volatility 
to explain some of the profits. The author estimated the risk premium from a general 
model of conditional CAPM and concluded that the profits were not unusual compared 
to risk. Kho evaluated the profits with weekly data, noting that the results might not be 
consistent with tests performed on the profits at a higher frequency. Another discussion 
on the risk-adjustment was raised on Menkhoff‟s and Taylor‟s study (2007), where the 
authors suggest methods to measure risk when assessing profitability of technical meth-
ods. Sharpe ratio, being a popular information ratio, was mentioned as the first choice, 
however was admitted to have its own challenges. In a recent study of technical meth-
ods on commodity markets, Yen and Hsu (2010) apply Sortino ratio to weight “posi-
tive” volatility. Menkhoff and Taylor (2007) summarize the views of technical rule risk 
assessment and note that with the knowledge of today the, determination of (even ap-
propriate) risk premia is questionable. 
 
As for derivatives, the interest on leverage possibilities in technical analysis utilizations 
by scholars seems to be relatively low. Charlebois and Sap (2007) have suggested that 
moving-average trading rules generate excess returns and these returns increase when 
the information is assigned on the open interest differential on currency options
1
. The 
authors assumed this to reflect risk premia and extra fundamental information in options 
prices. The leverage advantage may imply that options are the instruments of choice for 
informed trader (Easley, O‟Hara & Srinivas, 1998). 
  
3.4 Technical analysis as a complement of fundamental valuation 
 
Put in a simplified form, the traditional approach of scholars has been to view technical 
analysis as a substitute for fundamental factor inspection. In their study on equity valua-
tion, Bettman, Sault and Schultz (2009) propose an integration of technical and funda-
mental methods. Measuring the book value of the firm‟s equity, the dividend earnings 
per share, the past share prices at two time points, the consensus forecast earnings per 
share and adding dummy variables dependant on past stock returns of two time points, 
the authors model share price momentum. According to the authors, the evidence of 
                                                 
1
 The net difference between the cumulative value in dollar terms of all put options that are still active on 
a given day less the cumulative value of all active call options (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). 
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superior explanatory power in comparison to isolated utilizations suggests a comple-
mentary nature of the two measures. Furthermore, the authors note that in addition to 
share price valuation the model could serve the purpose in other valuation exercises, 
referring to Taylor‟s and Allen‟s (1990) reports of the proportion of foreign exchange 
market dealers relying on both fundamental and technical analysis to be some 90 %. 
Conclusion similar to Bettman et als (2009) was done by de Zwart, Markwat, Swinkels 
and van Dijk (2009), who studied Sharpe ratios formed by technical analysts and fun-
damental analysts on emerging foreign exchange currency markets. Combining these 
types of information improved performance in terms of risk. Findings of improvements 
in risk-adjusted performance are in line with Gehrig‟s and Menkhoff‟s (2004) reports on 
the extensive use of combinations of fundamental and technical analysis on foreign ex-
change markets. The authors also suggested extensions in research of statistical tech-
niques in combining fundamental and technical information. 
 
3.5 Data snooping 
 
Data snooping bias, also known as data mining bias, is often encountered as the phe-
nomena most invalidating the robustness of results in scientific technical analysis stud-
ies. Data snooping occurs when a data set is used more than once for model selection, 
leading to selection of algorithms that model the sample in which they are generated but 
do not perform out-of-sample. In their comprehensive study of technical trading rules, 
Brock et al. (1992) addressed the data snooping issue and suggested a use of 15-20 
years of data to avoid accidental parameter usage.  
 
The actual method was introduced by Efron (1979) and is called bootstrap, literally re-
ferring to pulling oneself up by one‟s own shoe laces. A similar methodology was fur-
ther employed by Sullivan et al. (1999) in their study of best performing technical in-
vestment rules. The authors reassessed the rules presented by Brock et al. (1992) and 
found the results to be robust for data snooping.  
 
Today the concept of data snooping is also a subject of market dynamics, as according 
to AMH (Lo, 2004) the autocorrelations in the markets vary over time, making out-of-
sample testing even more crucial. Evidence supporting th e AMH was found by Neely 
et al. (2009), who discovered that the profit opportunities generated by technical trading 
rule on 1970s and 1980s data could not be reproduced using data from the 1990s. A 
more recent conclusion in line with Lo (2004) and Neely et al. (2009) was made by Gi-
alenco and Protopapadakis (2011), who studied 14 currencies in foreign exchange mar-
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kets. The instability difficulties in the algorithms simulating out-of-sample returns cast-
ed serious doubt on the reliability and sustainability of technical rules used. 
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4. TECHNICAL INDICATORS 
 
 
4.1 Momentum indicators 
 
The methods used in technical analysis can be divided into two sub-groups. The appli-
cations in the first group are known as trend-following or “lagging” indicators. These 
tools, also known as momentum indicators, generally work best in a clearly defined 
trend (Menkhoff & Taylor, 2007). For instance, moving averages of different length are 
a very common momentum indicator. The use of moving or exponential averages aims 
to distinguish trends from noise by smoothing daily returns and identifying the fluctua-
tions by observing intersections between short and long moving averages or between 
asset price and moving average. Evidence for significant profit opportunities have been 
found for instance by Wong, Manzur and Chew (2003). A simple moving average (MA) 
for n days is calculated 
 
(1)  
 
                      , 
 
where Mt,n is the simple n-day moving average at period t and Ci is the closing price of 
period i. 
 
In addition to price data, volume information is used in momentum indicators such as 
On-balance volume average, introduced by Granville in 1964 (Hillery, 1986), and Mo-
mentum strategy in volume (Chan, Jegadeesh & Lakonishok, 1996). Both indicators are 
mainly used to detect trend weakness and reversals. A study of combination of indica-
tors has been performed by for instance Loh (2006), who performed tests on joint mov-
ing average indicator and a stochastic oscillator, which is a trend and momentum indica-
tor. Investigating market index data from Australia, Japan, Singapore, the United King-
dom and the United States, the author reports that the favored method among practition-
ers is effective in capturing past price information. The author interprets beating the 
benchmark at 1 % significance level as evidence of predictive power, suggesting the 
time-varying nature of weak form market efficiency as a further research area. 
 
 
Mt,n =
n
1
Ci
i=t-n+1
t
/
= (Ct + Ct-1 + ... + Ct-n+2 + Ct-n+1) /n
25 
 
4.2 Oscillators 
 
Indicators designed to capture price reversals are commonly called oscillators. These 
devices generally oscillate between a given range and are used to detect “overbought” 
and “oversold” levels of asset prices. These indicators are also known as reversal indica-
tors, as their purpose is the anticipation of trend changes. In this study the relative 
strength index is being under observation; however there are other methods with a simi-
lar purpose of seizing short-term price information content. For instance moving aver-
age convergence/divergence oscillator (MACD) and stochastic indicators have been 
subjects of empirical tests in academic literature (e.g. Garza-Gomez, Metghalchi & 
Chen, 2010 (MACD); Yen & Hsu, 2010 (stochastic indicator)).  
 
4.3 Visual pattern analysis 
 
A highly common approach by practitioners is visual observation of the price data 
which in it‟s simplified form aims to identify “support” and “resistance” levels of stock 
price charts, and probably is the reason why academics call technicians “chartists” and 
the practice itself a “voodoo finance” (Lo et al, 2000). In this sense quantitative finance 
employed by academics differs quite drastically from technical methods. Lo et al (2000) 
suggest that the reason for employment of geometrical tools and pattern recognition 
rather than mathematical and statistical methods might lie in both conductivity for hu-
man cognition and in human recognition being superior to computers in visual pattern 
analysis. The authors however note that in the presence of today‟s financial engineering 
the advantage is shifting towards computational analysis. This direction seems evident, 
considering that for the modern portfolio optimization it has always been an obvious 
choice to utilize the very edge of the available technology. From a theoretical perspec-
tive the visual pattern recognition, being virtually impossible to study empirically, hard-
ly offers evidence for or against abnormal earning possibilities by technical analysis.  
 
4.4 MFI-RSI hybrid 
 
4.4.1 Relative strength index 
 
Originally introduced by Welles Wilder (1978), relative strength index (hereafter RSI) 
is known as one of the most popular technical oscillators or counter-trend indicators 
(Wong et al, 2003). RSI is assumed to capture short-term trend reversals more accurate-
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ly on a non-trending market, as it would indicate overbought and oversold conditions 
too quickly under a clear upward or downward trend (Srivastava, 2007).  
 
RSI is the ratio of the positive price movement to the total movement over a given peri-
od of days. Let pt = closing price of an asset on a day t. Then let Ut ≡ pt if pt > pt-1 and 0 
otherwise and Dt ≡ pt if pt < pt-1 and 0 otherwise. An N-day RSI on day t is given by 
 
(2)     
 
where  
 
                                                                   . 
 
4.4.2 Money flow index 
 
Money flow index (hereafter MFI) was introduced by Birinyi, Jr (Yean & Hsu, 2010) 
and is also known as volume-weighted RSI. As MFI assumes values based on whether 
the daily returns have been positive or negative, it literally is designed to detect whether 
money is “flowing in or out” of the asset, that being, determining the direction of short-
term price movements caused by investors‟ opinion divergence (e.g. Bernard & Thom-
as, 1990). The trading volume of day t is denoted by Volt and the closing price of day t 
is denoted by pt, then MF
+
t = pt×Volt if pt > pt-1 and 0 otherwise and MF
-
t = pt×Volt if  
pt < pt-1 and 0 otherwise. We define positive money flow 
 
(3)                
 
and negative money flow 
 
(4)                                                         . 
 
An N-day MFI on day t is given by 
 
(5)                    
 
where MRt(N) = PMFt(N) / NMFt(N).  
 
RSIt (N) = 100 - 100/100/(1 + RSt (N)),
RSt (N) = Ut - i
i=0
N-1
/ / Dt - i
i=0
N-1
/
MFIt (N) = 100 - 100/100/(1 +MRt (N)),
PMFt(N) / MFt - i
+
i=0
N-1
/
NMFt(N) / MFt- i
-
i=0
N-1
/
27 
 
4.4.3 MFI and RSI trading methods 
 
The use of more than one technical indicator is assumed to reduce the number of noisy 
trading signals. Yen & Hsu (2010) have suggested the hybrid of MFI and RSI and found 
the strategy to outperform the benchmark on seven commodity markets. 
 
The trading signals indicated by MFI and RSI are dependant of both these values and 
the selected time period. As originally suggested by Wilder (1976), a 14-day period is a 
common length selection, however different lengths have been subjects of empirical 
testing by for instance Wong et al (2003), who found some evidence on predictive abili-
ties on 14- and 20-day RSI strategies. The authors also summarize the properties of RSI 
parameters in terms of variation, concluding that a shorter (longer) time period is to be 
used on more (less) volatile markets. A longer time period translates to less frequent 
trading signals whereas a short period generates noise and false signals, thus affecting 
the stability of the strategy in terms of volatility.  
 
As both MFI and RSI oscillate between 0 and 100, the trading signals are given by these 
values where several different methods have been introduced. Academics have recog-
nized levels commonly used by practitioners to be 30 as a „buy‟ signal (indicating an 
oversold market) and 70 as a „sell‟ signal (indicating an overbought market), however 
Wong et al (2003) have also performed tests for lower bounds of 20, 30 and 40 and 
higher bounds of 60, 70 and 80. As longer time periods stabilize the signals of topping 
and bottoming markets, the values closer to each others are generally suitable for them. 
 
Furthermore, Wong et al (2003) summarize the four main methods of utilizing RSI as a 
trading strategy: 
 
Touch 
 
The signal for entering long (short) position is generated when the RSI reaches the set 
lower (higher) bound, thus indicating oversold (overbought) market. 
 
Peak 
 
The signal for long (short) position is given when the RSI has crossed the lower (higher) 
bound and reverted in direction.  
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Retracement 
 
The signal for long (short) position is given when the RSI has crossed the lower (higher) 
bound, reverted in direction and returned to the given lower (higher) bound.  
 
50 Crossover 
 
The signal for long (short) position is generated when the RSI rises above 50 (falls be-
low 50). 
 
4.4.4 MFI-RSI hybrid construction and trading rules 
 
Utilizing the 50 Crossover strategy, we define the trading rules of MFI-RSI hybrid ac-
cording to Yen (2009) based on values of both MFI and RSI. Initially taking a long posi-
tion, we alter the position simply when either MFI or RSI cross the given crossover lev-
el 50. The trading vehicle signals the positions as follow: 
 
 Long entry (short exit): 
1. MFI(Nt) and RSI(Nt) cross the 50 level from below simultaneously.  
2. MFI(Nt) crosses the 50 level from below and RSI(Nt) stays below 50. 
3. RSI(Nt) crosses the 50 level from below and MFI(Nt) stays below 50. 
 
Short entry (long exit): 
1. MFI(Nt) and RSI(Nt) cross the 50 level from above simultaneously.  
2. MFI(Nt) crosses the 50 level from above and RSI(Nt) stays above 50. 
3. RSI(Nt) crosses the 50 level from above and MFI(Nt) stays above 50. 
 
The trade is made on the closing price of the trading day, assuming that there‟s a possi-
bility to alter the position immediately after the signal before the close. Thus, when a 
signal is given, the returns of that signal are calculated starting from the following trad-
ing day. Giving the said rules, the position is either long or short at any given time and 
no positions are assumed on risk-free assets. 
 
The returns are controlled with transaction costs. Two typical costs are taken into ac-
count as concluded by Rantapuska (2004) on Finnish stock market. For brokers that are 
members of HEX the trading costs are 0.00244 % and the costs for active household 
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investors are assumed to be 0.2 %
2
. As the MFI-RSI tests assume an environment where 
short selling is possible, every time the position is altered the transaction costs are de-
ducted on both buying (selling) and short selling (buying) the asset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 Rantapuska (2004) suggests an individual investor to have a cost per trade of EUR 8.25 + 0.2 %. In this 
study the trading universe is constructed assuming that the effect of fixed fee is insignificant when the 
investment is sufficiently large and the absolute costs are therefore not applied.  
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5. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
 
5.1  Market data and sample selection 
 
The data utilized in this study consists of price and volume data of 450 stocks in Hel-
sinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges during period 4.1.2005 – 29.3.2011. All 
data were collected from Datastream. Helsinki and Stockholm exchanges are part of 
NASDAQ OMX Nordic operating under NASDAQ OMX Group, Inc (NASDAQ 
OMX, 2011). Oslo stock exchange, Oslo Børs ASA, is fully owned by Oslo Børs VPS 
Holding ASA (Oslo Børs, 2011).  
 
All in all Datastream includes 846 firms listed in Finnish, Norwegian and Swedish stock 
exchanges during the period between 2005 and 2011. In order to be included in the final 
sample a single firm however has to have an uninterrupted series of price and volume 
entries on 1611 trading days. In the final sample there are altogether 450 stocks, of 
which 112 Finnish, 107 Norwegian and 231 Swedish firms. The data does not include 
dividends, but as noted by Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), excluding dividends has not a 
significant effect on the results. 
 
All data will be handled and tested on MS Excel. For the test four equally weighted in-
dices will be constructed, as the three markets will be studied both as an aggregated 
index and each of them separately. The combined indexes are created by using mean 
daily returns of each firm, and then calculating the cumulative returns. Also the aggre-
gated index is equally weighted between the three country indices, thus setting in fact 
more weight on the smaller markets Helsinki and Oslo. Equal weighting in a single 
market is likely to provide different results than observing an index generally used to 
follow the market. However the significance of this difference can be expected to di-
minish due to sample selection, which eliminates firms with IPOs and firms that have 
gone bankrupt during the observation period. Hence, a single extreme outlier is unlikely 
to distort the index.  
 
For the aggregated index the observation period is divided into sub-periods. As the 
global financial crisis affected the Nordic stock market during the period of this study, it 
is reasonable to observe MFI-RSI abilities based on market trends. In order to do this, a 
simple 200-day moving average is applied, which allows dividing the whole period into 
bull and bear periods. A declining 200-day moving average of the aggregated index 
31 
 
implies a bear market and an ascending moving average implies a bull market. Thus the 
period is divided into three sub-periods. The first period is bullish on 4.1.2005 – 
8.11.2007 (1
st
 Bull), the second period is bearish on 9.11.2007 – 3.7.2009 (Bear) and the 
third period is bullish on 2.9.2009 – 29.3.2011 (2nd Bull). Graph 1 illustrates the cumu-
lative returns of equal weighted indices of Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock markets 
on the sample period. The descriptive statistics of the final sample are presented in table 
1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Cumulative daily returns. The returns on an investment of 100 on Helsinki, Oslo and 
Stockholm sample stocks with equal weights during period 4.1.2005 – 29.3.2011. 
 
5.1.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 3 contains summary statistics for the entire series. The returns are calculated by 
weighting daily returns equally and then constructing accumulated series for all indices. 
The first bull period for aggregated index appears strongest leptokurtic, whereas the 
corresponding value during the bear period is the smallest one. As one could intuitively 
expect, the standard deviation of the sample is at its highest under the financial crisis, 
and under this volatile period the only negative mean returns emerge as well. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the sample price data. The table indicates the summary statistics of daily 
returns of equal weighted indices in Helsinki, Oslo, Stockholm and aggregated index. The aggregated 
index constructed of the three markets has been divided into sub-periods 
 
Sample Mean 
Standard 
Error 
Standard 
Deviation 
Kurtosis Skewness 
Number of 
observations 
Helsinki 0.000499 0.000228 0.009167 5.444 0.1069 1611 
Oslo 0.000510 0.000293 0.011756 7.359 -0.5680 1611 
Stockholm 0.000716 0.000265 0.010653 8.312 -0.3710 1611 
Aggregated 
index 
0.000575 0.000243 0.009770 7.121 -0.4397 1611 
Aggregated 
index 1
st
 Bull 
0.000976 0.000271 0.007314 10.495 -1.3271 728 
Aggregated 
index 1
st
 Bear 
-0.000779 0.000675 0.014016 3.255 -0.0286 431 
Aggregated 
index 2
nd
 Bull 
0.001220 0.000379 0.008050 5.989 -0.0363 452 
 
Similarly, volume statistics are summarized in table 4. Volume data isn‟t to be observed 
as a continuous price time series, as the aggregated volume is to anticipate investor 
opinion divergence. The strategy under investigation considers only past 14-day volume 
information in price weighting. 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the sample volume data. The table indicates the summary statistics of 
daily trading volumes of equal weighted indices in Helsinki, Oslo, Stockholm and aggregated index. The 
aggregated index constructed of the three markets has been divided into sub-periods 
 
Sample 
Mean daily 
volume 
(million shares) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(millions) 
Kurtosis Skewness 
Number of 
observations 
Helsinki 92.460 37.576 22.549 2.724 1611 
Oslo 168.305 74.009 16.027 2.548 1611 
Stockholm 200.807 60.664 7.468 1.416 1611 
Aggregated 
index 
461.573 136.405 4.225 1.248 1611 
Aggregated 
index 1
st
 Bull 
506.370 147.207 4.811 1.358 728 
Aggregated 
index 1
st
 Bear 
470.368 119.420 1.017 0.469 431 
Aggregated 
index 2
nd
 Bull 
379.550 87.569 2.890 1.010 452 
 
The trading volumes in the observed Nordic markets have declined during the observa-
tion period. An average turnover in Finland, Norway and Sweden during the first bull 
period was over 500 million shares per trading day, whereas the average volume in the 
last period lies below 400 million shares. The daily trading volumes throughout the full 
sample period are graphed on figure 2. The two major peaks of the declining volume 
curve were experienced on 7.6.2005 and 3.5.2007. 
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Figure 2. Aggregate volume under full sample period. The graph represents daily trading volume in Hel-
sinki, Oslo and Stockholm in millions of shares. 
 
5.2 Hypothesis 
 
Prior research has identified predictive abilities on RSI and MFI strategies. However 
there is evidence that abnormal returns can‟t be earned using technical analysis. Assum-
ing that Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges are effective, the information 
content of historical volume and price data are reflected in the current asset prices and 
therefore does not offer abnormal profit opportunities. MFI-RSI hybrid relies on ex-
tracting profitable information from past volume and price data in order to indicate 
short-term trend changes by its money flow and relative strength index values. As the 
assumption is that Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges effectively reflect all 
available information to an extent where profit opportunities exceeding market returns 
do not exist due to trading costs, the null hypothesis is formed 
 
H0: It is not possible to earn profits that exceed market return using MFI-RSI hybrid 
strategy in a costly trading environment. 
 
Thus the alternative hypothesis is 
 
H1: It is possible to earn profits that exceed market return using MFI-RSI hybrid strate-
gy in a costly trading environment. 
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5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Sharpe ratio 
 
The risk adjustment cannot be done simply by comparing the standard deviations of the 
strategy portfolio to the benchmark index, as concluded by Menkhoff and Taylor 
(2007). In order to observe risk-adjusted returns, Sharpe ratios are calculated. Also 
known as reward-to-variability and information ratio, Sharpe measures excess return per 
unit of risk. Taking into account both systematic and idiosyncratic risk, the ratio is de-
fined as 
 
(6)                       ,  
 
where µ = mean return of the observed investment strategy, r = mean return of the risk-
less asset and σ = standard deviation of the excess return µ - r.  In this study 12 month 
Euribor rate is used as a measure of riskless asset. The Euribor rate is obtained from 
Datastream. 
 
5.3.2 Sortino ratio 
 
As Sharpe ratio can be criticized of its risk-simplifying properties, namely penalizing 
for both downside and upside volatility, another measure of risk-adjusted returns is in-
troduced. Sortino ratio replaces Sharpe‟s standard deviation with the downside risk 
measure δ. Letting x denote the strategy returns, Sortino ratio is calculated  
 
(7)                                      , 
 
where 
 
                                                              , 
 
where f(.) is the probability density function of the strategy returns. 
 
5.3.3 Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for distribution normality 
 
Before choosing the test for statistical significance, the normality of the return distribu-
tion is to be examined. Applying Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, we use decision rule on the 
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1 % confidence level Critical D-value = 1.63  / N , where N = the number of observa-
tions. The results of MFI-RSI strategy differences from buy-and-hold strategy are pre-
sented in table 5. 
 
Table 5. The sample mean differences of the daily returns performed for test selection purposes. The tests 
performed on the aggregated index are done for the full observation period and under periods 1.2005 – 
8.11.2007 (1
st
 Bull), 9.11.2007 – 3.7.2009 (Bear) and 2.9.2009 – 29.3.2011 (2nd Bull). 
 
Index 
Transaction 
costs(%) 
Number of 
observation 
pairs 
Mean daily 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
D-value 
HEL 0.00244 1611 0.000466 0.013507  0.35 
HEL 0.2 1611 0.000026 0.013517 0.34 
STO 0.00244 1611 0.000318 0.016007 0.37 
STO 0.2 1611 -0.000090 0.016037 0.37 
OSL 0.00244 1611 0.000445 0.017403 0.39 
OSL 0.2 1611 0.000070 0.017369 0.38 
Aggregated index 0.00244 1611 0.000434 0.014607 0.39 
Aggregated index 0.2 1611 0.000091 0.014638 0.38 
1
st
 Bull 0.00244 728 -0.000001 0.009212 0.43 
1
st
 Bull 0.2 728 -0.000294 0.009180 0.42 
Bear 0.00244 431 0.002065 0.023000  0.29 
Bear 0.2 431 0.001689 0.023045  0.28 
2
nd
 Bull 0.00244 452 -0.000421 0.010794 0.38 
2
nd
 Bull 0.2 452 -0.000815 0.010895  0.37 
           
D-ratios exceeding the decision limit at 1% level suggest that the mean return differ-
ences are not normally distributed in any of the samples and the basic t-test is not there-
fore suitable. 
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5.3.4 Mann-Whitney rank-sum test for statistical significance 
 
For testing the MFI-RSI hybrid strategy against buy-and-hold strategy the basic Mann-
Whitney test is introduced. Comparing MFI-RSI strategy against buy-and-hold strategy, 
the decision rule for rejecting H0 is  
 
(8)                                          , 
 
where  
 
                                                                                          , 
                                    
where NBH = number of observations in buy-and-hold strategy sample, NC50 = number of 
observations in MFI-RSI strategy sample, Ri = rank of the sample size and 
 
(9) 
 
and 
 
(10)                                        . 
 
5.3.5 T-test for testing the long positions against short positions 
 
For testing the MFI-RSI buy signal returns against sell signal returns the basic t-test is 
introduced (Brock et al, 1992; Chong & Ng, 2008). The t-statistic as a decision rule for 
rejecting buy signal as a more profitable rule on significance level α is 
 
(11)                                                , 
 
 
where L = mean daily return of buy signals, S = mean daily return of sell signals,           
 = variance of buy signal daily returns and       = variance of sell signal strategy daily 
returns.  
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5.3.6 Simple regression model for testing the risk ratio dependence on MFI-RSI trad-
ing bound values 
 
For examination of Sharpe ratio sensitivity for all MFI-RSI crossover values between 0 
and 100, a basic regression is employed. The regression model is 
 
(12)      µMFI-RSI = α + βCMFI-RSI + ε , 
 
where µMFI-RSI = mean daily return of MFI-RSI strategy, α = the constant term, β = the 
coefficient term, CMFI-RSI = the crossover value of MFI-RSI strategy and ε = the error 
term. A higher constant term α would then indicate higher returns independent of the 
parameters set for trading as the coefficient term β defines how sensitive the returns are 
for MFI-RSI trading bound level. 
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6. RESULTS 
 
This section presents the empirical findings of the paper. The results are organized in 
the tables and further discussed in the writing.  
 
6.1 Strategy performance against the benchmark indices 
 
Table 6. The results of Mann-Whitney tests on buy-and-hold strategy (BUY-HOLD) compared against 
MFI-RSI strategy (C50). The numbers marked with ** and * denote significance on 5% and 10% level 
respectively. 
 
Sample 
Transaction 
costs (%) 
Investment 
strategy 
Mean daily 
return 
Z-statistic p-value 
HEL 0.00244 
BUY-HOLD 0.000499 
-0.78 0.434 
C50 0.000965 
HEL 0.2 
BUY-HOLD 0.000499 
0.74 0.460 
C50 0.000526 
STO 0.00244 
BUY-HOLD 0.000716 
0.50 0.620 
C50 0.001034 
STO 0.2 
BUY-HOLD 0.000716 
1.83 0.067 
C50 0.000627 
OSL 0.00244 
BUY-HOLD 0.000510 
0.53 0.598 
C50 0.000954 
OSL 0.2 
BUY-HOLD 0.000510 
1.63 0.103 
C50 0.000579 
Aggregated 
index 
0.00244 
BUY-HOLD 0.000575 
-0.12 0.902 
C50 0.001009 
Aggregated 
index 
0.2 
BUY-HOLD 0.000575 
1.00 0.317 
C50 0.000666 
1st Bull 0.00244 
BUY-HOLD 0.000976 
0.96 0.337 
C50 0.000975 
1st Bull 0.2 
BUY-HOLD 0.000976 
1.68 0.094 
C50 0.000682 
Bear 0.00244 
BUY-HOLD -0.000779 
    -2.08** 0.037 
C50 0.001286 
Bear 0.2 
BUY-HOLD -0.000779 
  -1.66* 0.097 
C50 0.000911 
2nd Bull 0.00244 
BUY-HOLD 0.001220 
1.12 0.261 
C50 0.000799 
2nd Bull 0.2 
BUY-HOLD 0.001220 
 1.92 0.055 
C50 0.000406 
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For the country indices during the full observation period the MFI-RSI in most cases 
yields profits higher than the market. However after Mann-Whitney test the results 
don‟t appear to be significant on any of the country indices. Still, the only negative 
country index profits are found in Stockholm, where the higher transaction costs force 
the returns 0.009 % below the Swedish market average. The returns on Stockholm sam-
ple are negative at 10 % level. The mean daily returns are presented on table 6. 
 
Market outperformance on significance level of 5 % is however found from the aggre-
gated index during the 19 months of financial crisis between 9.11.2007 and 3.7.2009. 
The daily return exceeding the index is 0.206 % when controlled for the smaller finan-
cial institute trading cost of 0.00244 % per trade, and after controlling for the higher 
transaction costs the mean daily return of 0.169 % exceeding the index average is still 
significant on the 10 % level. Hence, the existence of profit opportunities under bearish 
stock market conditions suggests a change in investor sentiment and therefore ineffi-
ciency on some level. On the bull market MFI-RSI signals lead to frequent trading 
causes complete erosion of abnormal profits, and holding the artificially constructed 
index outperforms the MFI-RSI strategy in all tests. When controlled for the higher 
trading cost of 0.2 % per trade, the results emerge significantly negative on 10 % level. 
All accumulated returns are seen on appendix A and the graphs are presented jointly 
with MFI-RSI curve on appendix B. 
 
6.2 Compensation for risk on bull and bear markets  
 
As statistically significant evidence on MFI-RSI abnormal earning opportunities exists 
on 5 % under bearish market conditions, a reasonable question is whether this profit is a 
compensation for risk.  
 
When controlled for the volatility, the MFI-RSI on country indices shows superior 
Sharpe and Sortino ratios under the full period on both high and low trading costs in all 
cases, except for Stockholm index when tested for higher transaction costs as indicated 
on Table 7. For aggregated index during the sub-periods the findings on risk-return rati-
os indicate that MFI-RSI underperforms under both bull periods and exceeds the market 
return and lowers the risk under the bear months, as is seen on Table 8. The buy-and-
hold strategy under the bear market in the observed Nordic countries naturally led to 
negative returns and negative Sharpe and Sortino ratios, and MFI-RSI strategy therefore 
appears to offer predictive power for what seems to have been unstable market envi-
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ronment. The actual standard deviations on daily returns of buy-and-hold and MFI-RSI 
strategies under the bear period, varying between 1.39 and 1.41 %, do not disclose risk-
relevant information, as both strategies 
 
Table 7. The results of the tests performed on country indices under the full observation period with 
Sharpe and Sortino risk-return ratios. MFI-RSI 50 crossover strategy is indicated by C50 and the returns 
are controlled by two different transaction costs. 
 
Sample 
Investment 
strategy 
Transaction 
costs 
Number of 
observations 
Mean daily 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Sharpe 
ratio 
Sortino 
ratio 
HEL 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 1611 0.000499 0.009167 0.042289 0.001944 
HEL C50 0.00244 1611 0.000965 0.009129 0.093450 0.004643 
HEL 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 1611 0.000499 0.009167 0.042289 0.001944 
HEL C50 0.2 1611 0.000526 0.009196 0.045025 0.002051 
STO 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 1611 0.000716 0.010653 0.056740 0.003094 
STO C50 0.00244 1611 0.001034 0.010627 0.086759 0.004874 
STO 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 1611 0.000716 0.010653 0.056740 0.003094 
STO C50 0.2 1611 0.000627 0.010702 0.048104 0.002498 
OSL 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 1611 0.000510 0.011756 0.033838 0.001796 
OSL C50 0.00244 1611 0.000954 0.011728 0.071851 0.004225 
OSL 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 1611 0.000510 0.011756 0.033838 0.001796 
OSL C50 0.2 1611 0.000579 0.011737 0.039821 0.002123 
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Table 8. The results of the tests performed on aggregated index under the full observation period and sub-
periods for Sharpe and Sortino ratios. The sub-periods consist of periods 25.1.2005 – 8.11.2007 (1st Bull), 
9.11.2007 – 3.7.2009 (Bear) and 6.7.2009 – 29.3.2011 (2nd Bull). 
 
Sample 
Investment 
strategy 
Transaction 
costs (%) 
Number of 
observations 
Mean daily 
return 
Standard 
deviation 
Sharpe 
ratio 
Sortino 
ratio 
Full 
period 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 1611 0.000575 0.009770 0.047420 0.002405 
Full 
period 
C50 0.00244 1611 0.001009 0.009735 0.092162 0.004959 
Full 
period 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 1611 0.000575 0.009770 0.047420 0.002405 
Full 
period 
C50 0.2 1611 0.000666 0.009815 0.056422 0.002865 
1
st
 Bull 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 728 0.000976 0.007314 0.116077 0.005467 
1
st
 Bull C50 0.00244 728 0.000975 0.007314 0.115945 0.005317 
1
st
 Bull 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 728 0.000976 0.007314 0.116077 0.005467 
1
st
 Bull C50 0.2 728 0.000682 0.007352 0.075479 0.003317 
Bear 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 431 -0.000779 0.014016 -0.066099 -0.004574 
Bear C50 0.00244 431 0.001286 0.013978 0.081463 0.005480 
Bear 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 431 -0.000779 0.014016 -0.066099 -0.004574 
Bear C50 0.2 431 0.000911 0.014071 0.054215 0.003492 
2
nd
 Bull 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.00244 452 0.001220 0.008050 0.144994 0.006686 
2
nd
 Bull C50 0.00244 452 0.000799 0.008103 0.092074 0.003879 
2
nd
 Bull 
BUY-
HOLD 
0.2 452 0.001220 0.008050 0.144994 0.006686 
2
nd
 Bull C50 0.2 452 0.000406 0.008241 0.042800 0.001505 
 
assume positions on the same assets at all times. The differences in variance are caused 
by the costs of frequent trading, which in fact is why the volatility of MFI-RSI strategy 
returns is seemingly lower than holding the index under bear market. However the MFI-
RSI positive returns during declining index translated to positive risk ratios indicate 
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capabilities of timing the stock market. The results are contrary to findings of Kho 
(1996), who suggests that abnormal returns of technical analysis can be explained by an 
increase in risk. During the economic downturn it seems evident that MFI-RSI strategy 
in fact captures the price reversals, smoothing the excessive volatility. This risk-
reducing property suggests that MFI-RSI applications are justified under somewhat ex-
ceptional conditions. 
 
As observing the tool itself, it‟s noteworthy that in the academic literature the theoreti-
cal foundations for altering time parameters are not strong. However the attribution for 
the Nordic equity market under financial crisis is found on the volatile market condi-
tions; consistent with Wong et al (2003), a shorter time parameter increases the MFI-
RSI sensitivity for short-term fluctuation. Utilizing the time span of two weeks appears 
to be a profitable investment method for the markets under examination under a declin-
ing 200-day moving average. 
 
6.3 Trading frequency and the returns on long and short positions 
 
The returns of long and short positions on country indices are summarized in Table 9. 
For the majority of the observation period (72.6 % on the aggregated index), a long po-
sition is assumed. The MFI-RSI strategy suggests most frequent trading on Helsinki 
stock index, where the position is altered 94 times, translating to an average investment 
period of 17 trading days. A high sensitivity for transaction costs is eminent, as the sim-
ulation of the environment of higher transaction costs leads to negative returns for short 
sales in Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm stock exchanges. In fact, the only test where sell 
signals yield positive returns is the aggregated index during the bear period.   
 
Of all trading days under the bear period the MFI-RSI strategy forecasted correctly 111 
loss days and 127 gain days. A long position was assumed or maintained due to a false 
signal on 99 days and a respective short position on 94 days. On the aggregated index 
there were 221 bullish days and 210 bearish days during the bear period under observa-
tion. The bear days naturally yielded stronger losses than the respective bull days, also 
leading to a far more volatile market environment than those of the bull markets before 
and after the financial crisis. 
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Table 9. The profitability of MFI-RSI position signals. The marked 0.2 after the index name indicates 
transaction cost of 0.2 percent while the strategy name only indicates transaction cost of 0.00244 percent. 
 
Sample 
N position 
changes 
Mean long Mean short Long days Short days 
Long on 
the market 
Short on 
the market 
HEL 94 0.001170 0.000574 1057 554 0.656 0.344 
HEL 0.2 94 0.000848 -0.000089 1057 554 0.656 0.344 
STO 86 0.001222 0.000598 1135 475 0.705 0.295 
STO 0.2 86 0.000944 -0.000117 1135 475 0.705 0.295 
OSL 77 0.001158 0.000391 1174 436 0.729 0.271 
OSL 0.2 77 0.000906 -0.000307 1174 436 0.729 0.271 
Aggregated 
index 
75 0.001136 0.000663 1169 441 0.726 0.274 
Aggregated 
index 0.2 
75 0.000920 -0.000009 1169 441 0.726 0.274 
1
st
 Bull 27 0.001165 -0.000022 607 120 0.835 0.165 
1
st
 Bull 0.2 27 0.000996 -0.000911 607 120 0.835 0.165 
Bear 23 0.000808 0.001814 226 205 0.524 0.476 
Bear 0.2 23 0.000493 0.001371 226 205 0.524 0.476 
2
nd
 Bull 25 0.001303 -0.000662 336 116 0.743 0.257 
2
nd
 Bull 25 0.001068 -0.001514 336 116 0.743 0.257 
 
For the aggregated index under the full sample period, an average period of investment 
was 21 days as seen on Table 10. In short, due to high frequency of trading, the profits 
appear as very sensitive for altering the transaction costs. Apart from the findings of 
profitable trading opportunities during a period under which the market experienced a 
great distress, the notions on profits eroded by transaction costs are very much in line 
with Fama & Blume (1966), stating that under efficient market no profitable infor-
mation can be extracted of price and volume data in a costly trading environment. Table 
10 presents the summary of the long and short position standard deviations and Sharpe 
ratios for the aggregated index. 
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Table 10. Aggregated index volatility and mean daily return for long and short positions. Transaction 
costs indicated by 0.00244 (%) and 0.2 (%). The numbers marked with ** and * denote significance on 
5% and 10% level respectively for a two-tailed test. The figures inside the brackets are the t-statistics.  
 
Period Position 
Mean daily 
return 
  
Standard 
deviation 
Sharpe ratio 
Full sample 
0.00244 
Long 0.001136 
(0.679) 
0.007641 0.134021 
Short 0.000663 0.01384 0.039829 
Full sample 
0.2 
Long 0.00092 
(1.323) 
0.007691 0.105031 
Short -0.000009 0.01396 -0.008648 
1st Bull 
0.00244 
Long 0.001165 
(1.150) 
0.006354 0.163385 
Short -0.000022 0.010946 -0.013653 
1st Bull 0.2 
Long    0.000996* 
(1.836) 
0.006354 0.136752 
Short -0.000911 0.011022 -0.094215 
Bear 
0.00244 
Long 0.000808 
(-0.732) 
0.011042 0.059771 
Short 0.001814 0.016639 0.100157 
Bear 0.2 
Long 0.000493 
(-0.634) 
0.011081 0.031159 
Short 0.001371 0.016777 0.072907 
2nd Bull 
0.00244 
Long    0.001303* 
(1.857) 
0.006967 0.179491 
Short -0.000662 0.010639 -0.067219 
2nd Bull 0.2 
Long      0.001068** 
(2.424) 
0.007110 0.142809 
Short -0.001514 0.010680 -0.146690 
 
Buy signals appear to outperform sell signals on the full period, however during the 
bear period sell signals are more profitable and outperform the buy signals also on 
Sharpe measurement. Overall MFI-RSI doesn‟t seem to generate usable signals for 
short positions during a bullish period, and when controlled for the higher trading cost 
level of 0.2 %, all sell signals generate negative profits. It is noteworthy that the stand-
ard deviations under short positions exceed the ones under long positions at all times, 
thus referring to a very volatile strategy. The high risk suggests a failure in capturing 
any profitable information on a climbing stock market. To illustrate the volatility differ-
ence between short and long signals, the 10-day return distributions of the returns ex-
ceeding aggregate benchmark index returns are graphed in figure 3. The figure of distri-
bution when going short indicates a volatile period, whereas long position returns ap-
pear low but stable. For the first day on a new position, the transaction cost of 0.2 % is 
included.  
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Figure 3. The daily return distributions of first 10 days of aggregate index difference between buy-and-
hold strategy and MFI-RSI strategy. The returns are reported on y-axis in percentages for both positions, 
short (left) and long (right), with x-axis representing function of time as the first 10 days. The returns are 
controlled for transaction costs of 0.2%. 
 
6.4 Additional insight for the sensitivity of Sharpe ratio for MFI-RSI parameter ad-
justment 
 
According to some scholars, the value of technical analysis in addition to generating 
returns exceeding the benchmark is adding value to the investment process (e.g. Lo et 
al.,2000; Bettmann et al., 2009). As risk-reducing properties have been identified on 
MFI-RSI strategy, an attention should be paid on a simple optimization for Sharpe ratio 
or similar risk-to-reward ratio in terms of parameter selection. 
 
In order to avoid risk of data mining, this thesis has only tested the results that have 
been obtained using a single value of 50 on MFI-RSI trading signal bound. In this sec-
tion a brief overview of risk ratio sensitivity for parameter altering is presented. The 
additional sensitivity control is performed on the aggregate index for the full sample 
period controlling for trading cost of 0.2 %. All crossover values between 0 and 100 are  
tested using interval of 0.1. The regression results are reported on table 11.  
 
The regression is as previously stated 
 
(12)      µMFI-RSI = α + βCMFI-RSI + ε , 
 
where µMFI-RSI = mean daily return of MFI-RSI strategy, α = the constant term, β = the 
coefficient term, CMFI-RSI = the crossover value of MFI-RSI strategy and ε = the error 
term. A higher constant term α is to indicate higher returns independent of the parame-
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ters set for trading and the coefficient term β is expected to describe how sensitive the 
returns are for MFI-RSI trading value. 
 
Table 11. The simple regression results for mean daily return dependence of crossover values. None of 
the values are statistically significant. The values inside the brackets are t-statistics. 
 
  α β 
 
0.085016 -0.001372 
p-value 0.000 0.000 
Standard error 0.001721 0.000030 
  (49.410) (-46.054) 
Squared R 0.680   
 
Significant t-stats are reported, suggesting that the simple regression model supports 
assumption of daily return dependence of the trading signal value used. For minimum 
value of 0 the MFI-RSI strategy earns the returns of holding the benchmark index, and 
using the maximum value of 100 corresponds shorting the index for the full sample pe-
riod. For all values of interval of 0.1 between 0 and 100 the highest mean daily return is 
earned using crossover bound of 47.5 (0.085 %), translating to a slightly higher 
weighting for long positions. The most unprofitable value in terms of mean daily returns 
is 92.2 (-0.058 %), as the short signals are dominative when the crossover value is high-
er.  
 
As for adjusting for risk, applying Sharpe ratios allows controlling for volatility. The 
highest and lowest Sharpe ratios for the aggregate index are achieved using the same 
parameters as the highest and lowest daily return averages, 47.5 and 92.2 respectively. 
Sharpe ratio varies between 0.075 and -0.071. The sensitivity of Sharpe ratio for adjust-
ing the MFI-RSI signal bound is graphically presented on figure 4. Significant depend-
ence is found between adjusting the crossover signal bound and the risk-to-reward ratio, 
and even a simple visual observations gives an indication of how adjusting the 
weighting for long and short signals effect the riskiness. Intuitively concluded, an opti-
mal value in terms of risk and reward is found between 30 and 60. This value is possi-
bly placing more weight on the long position, which is a natural assumption on a period 
under which the benchmark index yielded cumulative returns of 138 % and that only 
experienced one bearish period in terms of 200-day moving average of daily returns. 
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Figure 4. The sensitivity curve of Sharpe ratio for MFI-RSI Crossover strategy‟s trading bound adjust-
ment between 0 and 100 with intervals of 0.1. The graph represents mean daily returns of MFI-RSI strat-
egy utilized for aggregate index on full sample period controlled with transaction cost of 0.2 % per trade. 
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate whether abnormal returns can be yielded us-
ing MFI-RSI hybrid strategy. In order to further elaborate the predictive abilities of the 
strategy, the observation period was divided into sub-periods for examination of the 
capabilities under different market conditions.  
 
The results show no evidence of the abnormal profit opportunities during bull markets 
when utilizing only MFI-RSI strategy. The strategy in most occasions is superior to 
holding the market index, but statistical significance for beating the buy-and-hold strat-
egy is only found on 10 % level. During the bear market however the MFI-RSI strategy 
appears to beat the market and when controlled for the lower transaction costs applied 
for financial institutes, a significance of 5 % is discovered. 
 
Even though the sensitivity for the transaction costs in most tests suggests market effi-
ciency, the high level of predictability under the financial crisis raises an important 
question: As a hybrid of two technical oscillators in its very simplest form captures ab-
normal profit opportunities, does the market irrationality peak as the stock market falls? 
Shefrin (2002) suggests that the primary emotions determining investor‟s risk-taking 
behavior are greed, hope and fear – fear being intuitively the dominant emotion during a 
financial crisis. The uncertainty under the distress months 2007-2009 led to excessive 
volatility, forcing the prices to fluctuate further away from the fundamental values, thus 
possibly creating a trading environment suitable for technical analysis. Volatility has 
been attributed to market inefficiency by for instance Shiller (1981). The risk ratios cal-
culated for MFI-RSI strategy returns suggest that the method in fact has a smoothing 
effect on volatility and it thus enables reducing risk on short-term investments. Yet the 
strategy doesn‟t capture profitable components in bull market, suggesting that the mar-
ket would reflect the past price and volume information, thus functioning in a rational 
manner in accordance with weak form efficiency tests. Furthermore, it should be ob-
served that the bear period on which the strategy outperformed the benchmark indices is 
relatively short, raising a question on the validity of the results. According to Brock et 
al. (1992), a period of at least 15 years should be used to completely avoid the data 
snooping biases. The final conclusion drawn on MFI-RSI strategy performance results 
under the maximum period of 123 months in this study therefore can not be interpreted 
as supporting the alternative hypothesis claiming the strategy to contain predictive pow-
er. The uncovered predictive properties surely support the assumptions of adding value 
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to the investment process, but in terms of extracting valuable technical components the 
hypothesis of efficiency in the Nordic markets stands. 
 
In technical tool studies different bootstrap methods and sets of parameters have tradi-
tionally been used to estimate the predictive properties of each tool (e.g. Sullivan et al., 
1999). On the thesis at hand the interest lies mainly in a single tool with default settings, 
and its performance under different market conditions. An additional sensitivity test was 
performed for Sharpe ratio sensitivity for parameter adjustment in order to detect the 
maximum and minimum risk-reward ratios between the oscillator value range. It is 
however noteworthy that due to a relatively short observation period used in the study, 
one can, using in fact nothing but intuition, create bootstrap methods that seemingly 
capture asset price reversals
3
. The possibilities of reproducing this kind of tests are very 
low, and out-of-sample tests show that the modeling of patterns could be done for ran-
dom numbers in an equal manner (Jensen & Benington, 1970; Sullivan et al., 1999). 
Still, as significance at 5 % level was found for MFI-RSI strategy outperforming the 
benchmark index on bear market when controlled for the lower transaction costs of 
0.00244 %, a relevant subject of parameter manipulation is the adjustment of the bound 
marking overbought and oversold levels. For an oscillator assuming values between 0-
100 the tested value of 50 is not sensitive for market condition in any way. If allowed 
for adjustment of buy and sell signal threshold depending on the direction of 200-day 
moving average of the index, it can be possible to simply weight the sensitivity for long 
and short signals. In this study the buy signals beat sell signals significantly (10 %) on 
both bull periods, further suggesting the timing adjustment. Indeed, the short signals 
timed the aggregate index correctly only during the bear period, when the Nordic mar-
ket fell as a result of the financial crisis. When the weighting for the short position was 
increased, the Sharpe ratio fell drastically below zero. The negative risk-return ratio is 
naturally a result of shorting the index on bullish period. Still, even a visual observation 
of Sharpe ratio curve in terms of MFI-RSI values gives an intuitive suggestion of an 
optimal crossover signal value to lie between 30 and 60. This translates to risk-reducing 
properties for the investment process that are achieved through an active trading and 
that do outperform holding the benchmark index. 
 
                                                 
3
 Apart from this study, I have constructed a technical indicator vehicle on MS Excel using eleven signals 
based on five different technical indicators. Using approximately 18 months of price and volume data at a 
time, the parameters of each indicator can be adjusted to simulate best performing rules for individual 
stocks. Again, with a rather little effort, buy-and-hold strategy is beaten in the simulation but no evidence 
exists on whether the rules in reality outperform the benchmark out-of-sample or not. The vehicle is 
available on request. 
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The examination of distribution of the MFI-RSI strategy returns is a research area that 
could be extended as well. Practitioners‟ approaches include a variety of ways to empir-
ically mine for risk-reducing strategies in short horizon trades, such as setting stop-loss 
limits or investigating different lengths of investments periods, and a range of methods 
to exploit speculative investment forms in terms of derivative trading for leverage gain. 
If a sufficiently long observation period is used, the results of predictive power of MFI-
RSI strategy could be extended. Given that this amount of data were sufficiently large 
and the strategy‟s „oversold‟ and „overbought‟ limits aiming to reflect the price and vol-
ume fluctuation information content were further deconstructed, perhaps components 
even more valuable to the investment process could be extracted. This would mean a 
more rational technical approach to studying the informational content of volatility and 
trading volume, and the tests could be made on for instance timing of the trade. When 
the MFI-RSI strategy gives a trading signal, an indication is theoretically given on 
whether the market is sentimentally preparing for a short horizon increase or decrease in 
value. On a short 14-day time span, the indication of a change in the sentiment is ex-
pected to be utilized immediately. However, the shorter the period in use, the more sen-
sitive the oscillator is and more often a false signal occurs. For longer periods MFI and 
RSI provide more reliable signals, but analyzing technical details in longer horizon ar-
guably does not respond well to changes in fundamentals and macroeconomic factors.  
 
In this study some evidence has been found for technical analysis profitability under a 
market downturn, supporting the use of technical methods as decision assistance. As a 
further research I would, as an even more robust subject of investigation than the earlier 
said parameter manipulation, suggest the use of fundamental ratios and parameters as a 
supporting vehicle to the MFI-RSI strategy or another technical indicator. The condition 
of the broad market has effect on the usability of technical methods, however certain 
events are derived from investor irrationality and can not be explained by change in 
fundamentals. Therefore the technical predictabilities in terms of investor sentiment and 
opinion divergence are equally favorable subjects for future research. On a broad mar-
ket index level a weighted index should be used to ensure an effortless replication of the 
results. 
 
Further integration of technical and fundamental analysis has been suggested by e.g. 
Bettman et al. (2008), who studied momentum strategy alongside book value and divi-
dend history. On a firm level, a large number of financial ratios could be used to esti-
mate the suitability of MFI-RSI application as an investment decision support tool or a 
position timing indicator. As the Nordic markets in this study were selected geograph-
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ically and include quite thinly traded stocks, a firm‟s capitalization‟s effect on the tech-
nical rule profitability on the said markets is an especially interesting subject of future 
research. 
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APPENDIX A. Graphed cumulative daily returns of the performed tests on the con-
structed equally weighted indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregated index under full sample period, transaction costs 0.00244%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregated index under full sample period, transaction costs 0.2%. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregated index on the first bull period, transaction costs 0.00244 %. 
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Chart 3. Aggregated index on the first bull period, transaction costs 0.2 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregated index on the bear period, transaction costs 0.00244 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregated index on the bear period, transaction costs 0.2 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Aggregated index on second bull period, transaction costs 0.00244 %. 
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Aggregated index on second bull period, transaction costs 0.2 %. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Helsinki stock index during the full sample period. On the graph LO stands for transaction costs of 
0.00244 % and HI stands for costs of 0.2 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo stock index during the full sample period. On the graph LO stands for transaction costs of 0.00244 
% and HI stands for costs of 0.2 %. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stockholm stock index during the full sample period. On the graph LO stands for transaction costs of 
0.00244 % and HI stands for costs of 0.2 % 
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APPENDIX B. The indices graphed jointly with the respective MFI and RSI oscillator 
curves 
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APPENDIX C. Stocks included in the study 
 
 
HELSINKI Lassila & Tikanoja PLC 
 
Lemminkainen OYJ 
Alandsbanken ABP M-Real OYJ 
Aldata Solution OYJ Marimekko OYJ 
Amanda Capital OYJ Martela OYJ 
Amer Sports OYJ Metso OYJ 
Aspo OYJ Neo Industrial OYJ 
Aspocomp Group OYJ Nokia Corporation 
Atria OYJ Nokian Renkaat OYJ 
Basware OYJ Nordic Aluminium OYJ 
Biohit OYJ Norvestia OYJ 
Biotie Therapies OYJ Nurminen Logistics OYJ 
Capman OYJ Okmetic OYJ 
Cencorp OYJ Olvi OYJ 
Citycon OYJ Oral Hammaslaakarit OYJ 
Componenta OYJ Orion Corp. 
Comptel OYJ Outokumpu OYJ 
Cramo OYJ Panostaja OYJ 
Digia PLC PKC Group OYJ 
Dovre Group OYJ Pohjois-Karjalan Kirjapaino OYJ 
Efore OYJ Pohjola Pankki A 
Elecster OYJ Ponsse OYJ 
Elektrobit OYJ Poyry OYJ 
Elisa OYJ QPR Software PLC 
Etteplan OYJ Raisio PLC 
Exel Composites OYJ Ramirent OYJ 
F-Secure OYJ Rapala VMC Corp. 
Finnair OYJ Rautaruukki OYJ 
Finnlines OYJ Raute OYJ 
Fiskars OYJ Revenio Group OYJ 
Fortum OYJ Ruukki Group OYJ 
Geosentric OYJ Sampo OYJ 
Glaston OYJ Sanoma Corporation 
Hkscan OYJ Scanfil OYJ 
Honkarakenne OYJ Solteq OYJ 
Huhtamaki OYJ Soprano OYJ 
Ilkka Yhtyma OYJ Sponda OYJ 
Incap OYJ SSK Suomen Saastajien Kiinteistot OYJ 
Innofactor PLC Stockmann OYJ 
Interavanti OYJ Stonesoft OYJ 
Ixonos OYJ Stora Enso OYJ 
Kemira OYJ Suominen Yhtyma OYJ 
Keskisuomalainen OYJ Takoma OYJ 
Kesko OYJ Talentum OYJ 
Kesla OYJ Technopolis OYJ 
Kone OYJ Tecnotree OYJ 
Konecranes OYJ Tectia OYJ 
Lannen Tehtaat OYJ Tekla OYJ 
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Teleste OYJ Bergs Timber AB 
Tieto OYJ Betsson AB 
Tiimari PLC Bilia AB 
Trainers House OYJ Billerud AB 
Tulikivi OYJ Biogaia AB 
Turkistuottajat OYJ Bioinvent International AB 
Turvatiimi OYJ Biophausia AB 
UPM-Kymmene OYJ Biotage AB 
Uponor OYJ Bjorn Borg AB 
Vacon OYJ Boliden AB 
Vaisala OYJ Bong Ljungdahl AB 
Viking Line ABP Bredband2 I Skandinavien AB 
Wartsila OYJ Bringwell International AB 
Wulff-Group PLC Brinova Fastigheter AB 
YIT OYJ BTS Group AB 
Yleiselektroniikka OYJ Bure Equity AB 
Nordea Bank AB Cardo AB 
Teliasonera AB Castellum AB 
 
Catella 'A' 
STOCKHOLM Cellpoint Connect AB 
 
Cision AB 
3L System AB Clas Ohlson AB 
A-Com AB Clean Tech East Holding AB 
Acando AB Concordia Maritime AB 
Acap Invest AB Connecta AB 
Accelerator Nordic AB Conpharm AB 
Active Biotech AB Consilium AB 
Addnode AB Corem Property Group AB 
Addtech AB Creative Antibiotics Sweden AB 
Addvise LAB Solutions AB CTT Systems AB 
AF AB Cybercom Group Europe AB 
Alfa Laval AB Diamyd Medical AB 
Alliance Oil Company Limited Digital Vision AB 
Altero AB Doro AB 
Anoto Group AB Duroc AB 
Aqua Terrena International AB Elanders AB 
Aros Quality Group AB Electrolux AB 
Artimplant AB Elekta AB 
Aspiro AB Elektronikgruppen Bk AB 
Assa Abloy AB Elos AB 
Atlas Copco AB Emitor Holding AB 
Atrium Ljungberg AB Enea AB 
Avanza Bank Holding AB Eniro AB 
Avensia Innovation AB Entraction Holding AB 
Axfood AB Ericsson Telephone AB 
Axis AB Expanda AB 
Axlon Group AB Fabege AB 
B & B Tools AB Factum Electronics Holding AB 
Beijer Alma AB Fagerhult AB 
Beijer Electronics AB Fast Partner AB 
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Fastighets Balder AB Malmbergs Elektriska AB 
Feelgood Svenska AB Meda AB 
Fenix Outdoor AB Medcap AB 
Fingerprint Cards AB Medivir AB 
Firefly AB Mekonomen AB 
G & L Beijer AB Metro International SA 
Getinge AB Micronic Mydata AB 
Getupdated Internet Marketing AB Midsona AB 
Geveko AB Midway Holdings AB 
Gunnebo AB Mobyson AB 
H & M Hennes & Mauritz AB Modern Times Group MTG AB 
Haldex AB Morphic Technologies AB 
Heba AB Multiq International AB 
Hedson Technologies International AB NCC AB 
Hexagon AB Net Insight AB 
Hifab Group AB Netonnet AB 
HIQ International AB Netrevelation AB 
Hoganas AB New Wave Group AB 
Holmen AB Nibe Industrier AB 
HQ AB Nobia AB 
Hufvudstaden AB Nolato AB 
IBS AB Nordea Bank AB 
IDL Biotech AB Nordic Service Partners Holdings AB 
Impact Coatings AB Nordnet AB 
Industrial & Financial Systems AB Note AB 
Industrivarden AB Novestra AB 
Intellecta AB Novotek AB 
Intoi AB OEM International AB 
Intrum Justitia AB Opcon AB 
Investment AB Kinnevik B Orasolv AB 
Investor AB ORC Software AB 
Invisio Communications AB Oresund Investment AB 
Itab Shop Concept AB Oriflame Cosmetics SA 
Jeeves Information Systems AB Ortivus AB 
JLT Mobile Computers AB PA Resources AB 
JM AB Partnertech AB 
Kabe Husvagnar AB PEAB AB 
Karo Bio AB Phonera AB 
Kindwalls AB Poolia AB 
Klick Data AB Precio Systemutveckling 
Klovern AB Precise Biometrics AB 
Know It AB Prevas AB 
Kungsleden AB Pricer AB 
Labs2Group AB Proact It Group AB 
Lagercrantz AB Probi AB 
Lappland Goldminers AB Proffice AB 
Latour Investment AB Profilgruppen AB 
Lundbergforetagen AB Ratos AB 
Lundin Petroleum AB Raysearch Laboratories AB 
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Luxonen SA Readsoft AB 
Rederi AB Transatlantic Wallenstam AB 
Rejlerkoncernen AB Xano Industri AB 
RNB Retail And Brands AB 
 
Rorvik Timber AB OSLO 
Rottneros AB 
 
Saab AB ABG Sundal Collier Holding ASA 
Sagax AB Acta Holding ASA 
SAK I AB AF Gruppen ASA 
Sandvik AB Aker ASA 
SAS AB Aker Biomarine ASA 
SCA AB Aker Solutions ASA 
Scania AB Aktiv Kapital ASA 
SE Banken Apptix ASA 
Seco Tools AB Arendals Fossekompani 
Sectra AB Atea ASA 
Securitas AB Aurskog Sparebank ASA 
Semcon AB Bionor Pharma ASA 
Sensys Traffic AB Birdstep Technology ASA 
Sigma AB Blom ASA 
Sintercast AB Bonheur ASA 
Skanska AB Borgestad ASA 
SKF AB Byggma ASA 
Skistar AB Camillo Eitzen & Co 
Smarteq AB Contextvision AB 
Softronic AB Data Respons ASA 
Srab Shipping AB Diagenic ASA 
SSAB AB DNB Nor ASA 
Starbreeze AB DNO International ASA 
Studsvik AB DOF ASA 
Svedbergs AB Domstein ASA 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB EDB Ergogroup ASA 
Svolder AB Eitzen Maritime Services ASA 
Sweco AB Ekornes ASA 
Swedbank AB Eltek ASA 
Swedish Match AB Farstad Shipping ASA 
Switchcore AB Fred Olsen Energy ASA 
Taurus Energy AB Frontline Limited 
Tele2 AB Ganger Rolf ASA 
Teliasonera AB GC Rieber Shipping ASA 
Tethys Oil AB Golar LNG Limited 
Traction AB Golden Ocean Group Limited 
Transcom Worldwide SA Goodtech ASA 
Trelleborg AB Green Reefers ASA 
Unibet Group PLC Hafslund ASA 
Uniflex AB Helgeland Sparebank ASA 
VBG Group AB Hexagon Composites ASA 
Venue Retail Group AB HOL Sparebank ASA 
Vitec Software Group AB Holand OG Setskog Sparebank 
Vitrolife AB Hurtigruten ASA 
Volvo AB IGE Resources AB 
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Ignis ASA Storebrand ASA 
IM Skaugen ASA Subsea 7 SA 
Indre Sogn Sparebank SWAN REEFER ASA 
Inmeta Crayon ASA Teco Maritime ASA 
Itera ASA Telenor ASA 
Jinhui Shipping & Transportation Limited TGS-Nopec Geophysical Company ASA 
Kitron ASA Tomra Systems ASA 
Komplett ASA Totens Sparebank ASA 
Kongsberg Gruppen ASA TTS Group ASA 
Kverneland ASA Veidekke ASA 
Leroy Seafood Group ASA Wilhelmsens Wilhelmsen Holdings ASA 
Marine Harvest ASA Yara International ASA 
Medi-Stim ASA 
 
NES Prestegjelds Sparebank 
 
Nordic Semiconductor ASA 
 
Norse Energy Corp. ASA 
 
Norsk Hydro ASA 
 
Norske Skogindustrier ASA 
 
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 
 
Norwegian Car Carriers ASA 
 
Odfjell ASA 
 
Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap 
 
Opera Software ASA 
 
Origio A/S 
 
Orkla ASA 
 
Petroleum Geo Services ASA 
 
Petrolia ASA 
 
Photocure ASA 
 
Prosafe SE 
 
PSI Group ASA 
 
Q-Free ASA 
 
Rieber & SON ASA 
 
Rocksource ASA 
 
Sandnes Sparebank ASA 
 
Scana Industrier ASA 
 
Schibsted ASA 
 
Sevan Marine ASA 
 
Sinoceanic Shipping ASA 
 
Skiens Aktiemolle ASA 
 
Solstad Offshore ASA 
 
Sparebank 1 Buskerud Vestfold ASA 
 
Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge ASA 
 
Sparebank 1 SMN 
 
Sparebank 1 SR Bank ASA 
 
Sparebanken More ASA 
 
Sparebanken Ost ASA 
 
Sparebanken Pluss ASA 
 
Sparebanken Vest ASA 
 
Statoil ASA 
 
Stolt-Nielsen Limited 
 
 
 
